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Abstract  
Sometimes established institutions aren’t perfect but cannot be replaced with better solutions. In 
situations of this kind, forestalling decay, not forcing progress, is the order of the day. But what needs 
to be done to prevent change for the worse? Must anything be done at all? To help answering these 
questions, the article explores conservation as a mode of political action. It argues that securing the 
choice to retain a comparatively favored institution becomes a practical challenge for legislators when 
technological, economic, ecological and other external developments threaten to turn its effective 
function away from which we value it. To cope with the task, legislators must resolve Edmund Burke’s 
‘conservation paradox’ in which existing arrangements can only stay the same if they are changed. The 
article provides a formal solution by construing political conservation as renovative reformism that 
adapts institutional structures, cultures or mechanisms to changing circumstances in order to prevent the 
accidental transformation of institutional mandates, and points out why political disputes may arise even 
among persons who are equally interested in leaving things as they are. 
 
Keywords  




An important objective of political theory is to establish principles and generalities that provide 
normative guidance for political action. The question—what is the best possible thing to do in the current 
situation?— often appropriately motivates the inquiry into possibilities of improving the present state 
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of affairs. Scholars will accordingly try to identify elements of the existing social order that fail to realize 
normative principles such as liberty, equality or justice and develop institutional alternatives. A 
prominent example of such scholarship is the Rawlsian rejection of welfare state capitalism in favor of 
a property-owning democracy or market socialism (see e.g. O’Neill and Williamson, 2012). However, 
occasionally the best thing to do in politics is to leave things as they are. In situations of this kind, non-
change is desirable even though there might be room for improvement; forestalling decay, not forcing 
progress, is the order of the day. What resources has political theory to offer to practitioners of politics 
in such cases? Are there any principles or generalities that provide normative guidance when the task 
consists in preventing institutional achievements from being lost? In contrast to the task of realizing 
change for the better, it appears, the task of averting change for the worse has not been sufficiently 
explored. 
There are several possible explanations for why political conservation has slipped the attention of 
scholars whether in the liberal, socialist or conservative traditions. One that will mainly occupy us here 
is a propensity across these traditions to expect that the institutional status quo persists unchanged unless 
legislators implement a scheme to change it. We will see later that this expectation does not qualify as 
valid reasoning that provides reliable guidance for political practice. But of course there are other 
explanations, too. Occasionally an emancipatory self-understanding may have lead scholars to assume 
that there is always room for improvement. Huntington (1965, p. 393; see also Smith, 2016, p. 350) 
once noted in this sense that a strong commitment to the theory of progress makes political decay an 
unthinkable concept. Furthermore, in some schools of political theory conservation simply doesn’t occur 
as a task. ‘Ethics first’ approaches (Williams, 2005, pp. 1–3) promise to provide normative guidance for 
political practice independently of the currently established order. Finding out what the best possible 
thing to do requires a comparative understanding of better-ness, which we can only reach by weighing 
the desirability and feasibility of conceivable institutional alternatives against the normative quality and 
stability of existing arrangements. Yet ‘ethics first’ theorists tend to bracket the comparison out of their 
analysis, suggesting that this is the point where political theorists and political scientists divide labor. 
Furthermore, change for change’s sake seems to be ingrained in the nature of democratic systems. They 
‘encourag[e] both activism and the rhetorical defences that will rationalize such activism’ (Brennan and 
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Hamlin, 2004, pp. 683–4). Finally, considering the discipline of political theory more generally, the 
neglect of conservation might also reflect a male-biased apparatus of social analysis. Just as Heidegger 
(1971, pp. 147–9) implicitly prioritized ‘building’ (as the world-founding of an active subject) over 
‘preserving’ (as epitomized by agriculture and housework) despite claiming that they are equally 
important moments of human life (Irigaray, 1992; Young, 1997, ch. VII), so might political theorists 
tend to suppose that institutional innovation is what really matters in politics. But, as Iris Young (1997, 
pp. 152) notes after reminding us that for Arendt the quintessential moment of human meaning and 
individuality is that of founding, ‘as soon as the deeds of founding are accomplished, as soon as the 
heroic work of the artist, the statesman, or planner are recognized and celebrated, a new task comes into 
play: preservation.’ 
The literature that operates under the label ‘conservatism’ is, without a doubt, a viable source of 
inspiration for the exploration of conservation as a mode of political action but doesn’t effectively 
mitigate the scholarly neglect of this topic as we will see. For many readers this might not come as a 
real surprise. According to a particularly influential view, conservatism – contrary to what the meaning 
of the word ‘to conserve’ suggests – does not oppose institutional change. Although conservatives have 
often defended certain historical institutions against reformers and revolutionaries, they are not 
concerned with the conservation of existing institutions as such. Their main focus is instead, as for 
instance Michael Freeden (1996, esp. 332) has argued, on ways to render institutional change safe. The 
mode of political action conservatives primarily bank on, accordingly, is progressive action. The main 
difference to proponents of other emancipatory ideologies is the strategy to rely on gradual or 
incremental reforms because—compared with ambitious schemes of social engineering—they are likely 
to be better calculable, less costly, more efficient and reversible.1 According to other accounts (e.g. 
Beckstein 2015; Brennan and Hamlin 2004; 2016a; 2016b; Cohen 2007; 2013; Huntington 1957; 
                                                        
1  See e.g. O’Hara (2016). Concurring with this view, Jerry Z. Muller (1997, p. 7) considers ‘historical 
utilitarianism’ to be the common denominator of conservative theories. 
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Oakeshott 1991a), conservatism is intrinsically linked with the goal of conservation.2 However, the 
primary concern of conservative theory on this view is on why we might want to keep things as they are 
(rather than how we can manage to do so). And the conservative classics commonly interrogated to 
reflect about such reasons such as Burke, (2009) Huntington (1957) or Tomasi di Lampedusa (1970, p. 
40) merely provide a rough idea about the practical challenge associated with the goal of realizing non-
change. In short, conservation as a mode of political action has not been a subject of detailed analysis 
in conservative theory either. 
The neglect of conservation as a mode of political action points towards a gap, which to fill is of 
general interest for scholarship on politics. Yet filling the gap is also a task of practical relevance, 
moreover one that is particularly urgent to address today. As has often been corroborated since 
Habermas’s (1986) intervention in the 1980s, large segments of Western societies appear to experience 
an exhaustion of utopian energies. ‘We’ve buried utopia […], we can’t imagine a better world than the 
one we’ve got’, observes Bregman (2016, back cover), for instance. Fears that institutional 
achievements (such as the welfare state or representative democracy) could be hollowed out (be it by 
neoliberals, lobbyists, technocrats or populists; see e.g. Crouch, 2004) are more widespread than hopes 
for a better realization of principles of justice. Surveys also show that many in the West are pessimistic 
about the future prospects for the youth. Four of five in the United States question the country’s 
progressive ethos by doubting that their youth will grow up to be better off than they themselves. In 
France seven out of ten are even more decidedly pessimistic about the future prospects of their children’s 
generation (Ipsos MORI, 2014; see also Taylor, Funk and Craighill, 2006). Ipsos MORI (2017) even 
attributes the increasing tendency to cherish what we’ve got a worldwide significance, and lists the 
‘return to tradition’ as the second most important ‘global mega trend 2017’. This might be a deplorable 
development, ‘a global epidemic of nostalgia’ (Boym 2001, xiv; see also Bauman 2017, 5). We might 
                                                        
2
  This paper doesn’t need to side with one or the other camp as the main focus is on a general mode 
of political action rather than an ideology. To indicate this paper’s agnosticism concerning the 
relationship of conservative ideology and the practical task of order maintenance, I will speak of 
‘political conservation’ (rather than, for instance, ‘conservative action’). 
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well need to reinvigorate progressive thinking and redirect our attention to ways of making the world a 
better place. At the same time, a democracy ought to be responsive to the actual preferences of citizens. 
If many people in our countries are more concerned about falling backwards instead of hoping to 
progress forward, there is good reason to reflect about how we can manage, at least as a political 
minimum, to avert change for the worse. 
To plausibilize the assumption that there can be situations in which legislators ought to desist from 
replacing imperfect institutions, the article begins with a list of six considerations for opposing 
institutional change in politics. It suggests that political conservation must be considered a general mode 
of political action which is relevant independently of specific ideological (especially conservative) 
commitments (2). It then refutes the view that legislative procedures and revolutions are the only 
significant threats for the continued existence of established institutions. It argues that institutions may 
be hollowed out without intentional actor interference because the world changes around them. 
Strategies of maintaining established institutions must therefore usually take the form of positive action 
rather than quietism (3). On this basis, readers are introduced to Burke’s ‘paradox of conservation’, 
according to which existing arrangements must change to stay the same, and a formal solution to this 
(seeming) paradox is developed. The solution construes political conservation as a kind of renovative 
reformism that adapts institutional structures, cultures or mechanisms to changing circumstances in 
order to prevent the accidental transformation of institutional mandates (4). After a brief note about 
controversies that might arise among people who equally want to leave things as they are, the concluding 
part spells out implications for normative political theory and provides a version of how political 
conservation can be an unexpected source of progress (5). 
To reduce complexity, the discussion is carried through on the level of legal institutions rather than 
entire political orders. Moreover, the focus is on (legal) institutions rather than other things that might 
also embody social capital, such as ways of life or particular buildings. Further insights into the topic 
could, without a doubt, be gained via concrete and detailed applications rather than brief examples of 




2 Why settle for the status quo? 
Legal institutions, such as the freedom of speech, unemployment insurance, marriage, the police or state 
schools are ‘systems of rules governing specific social action in the context of a comprehensive social 
order’ (Ruiter, 2001, p. 71). They are outcomes of politics even though they may often be deeply 
entrenched in immemorial social customs and tradition. As outcomes of politics, Popper (1972, p. 133) 
says, legal institutions ‘fulfil certain prima facie social functions’ (such as teaching or policing) that in 
turn serve certain ‘prima facie social purposes’ (such as the propagation of knowledge or protection 
from violence). With the qualification ‘prima facie’, Popper makes two stipulations. On one hand, 
institutions may serve unintended or latent functions in addition to what they are designed to do, for 
instance, by influencing other institutions in a manner not recognized by us. On the other hand, 
individuals may run institutions in such a way as to serve their own purposes rather than the designated 
ones. Officers may accept bribes and thus participate in crime rather than prosecute it, while teachers 
may propagate personal opinions instead of knowledge (Popper, 1972, p. 134). 
When an established institution fails to do what we want them to do, we should explore options to 
rectify the problem by either replacing or substantially modifying that institution. But to explore options 
does not yet mean finally to decide to seek replacement or deep modification of the institution in 
question. At least six distinct types of considerations may lead us to the conclusion that sometimes the 
best thing to do is to leave things as they are, and for that matter, refrain from changing established 
institutions or substituting them with conceivable alternatives: lack of alternatives, transition costs, 
precaution, existence value, lack of feasibility, and democratic authorization. 
 
2.1 Lack of alternatives 
The most obvious reason for not substantially changing or substituting an existing institution consists in 
the lack of alternatives. We might not think that some existing institution is objectively flawless: 
perfectly just, efficient, etc. But any deviation from the status quo is objectionable as long as we are not 
aware of normatively more desirable alternatives. 
 
2.2 Transition costs 
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Institutional change is not free of charge. It brings material as well as learning costs for those subjected 
to the institution in question. A re-equilibration of the institutional configuration is necessary if the 
replaced institution was functionally intertwined with others. Past policy choices, as path dependency 
theory tells us, may lower the incentives for institutional change up to the point of ‘lock-ins’ (Pierson, 
2000; see also and Brennan and Hamlin, 2016[b], pp. 346 and Aristotle, Politics, II.8; Plato, The Laws, 
ch. VII). Replacing or substantially changing an existing institution is therefore undesirable unless the 
value of the envisioned alternative exceeds the value of the existing institution plus transition costs. 
 
2.3 Precaution3 
Another type of reason that partly revolves around transition costs stems from epistemic considerations. 
Both means and ends in politics are clouded by uncertainty. We cannot know for sure what an 
objectively perfect institution looks like, and if we think we know, we still cannot be sure to realize it 
in practice. As we lack a holistic grasp of social life, there is the permanent danger to underestimate the 
mutual interdependencies among institutions and to miscalculate the future behavior of the individuals 
that are subjected to them (Berlin, 1990; Burke, 2009, p. 61; Oakeshott, 1996, esp. p. 31; O’Hara, 2011, 
ch. 2–3; Quinton, 1978). In addition to this, it has been argued that arrangements of the status quo are 
systematically undervalued, for instance, because they serve as storage systems for accumulated 
practical knowledge (Kriele, 1979, pp. 42, 49; Oakeshott, 1991c; Quinton, 1978; pp. 16–7). Innovation 
designed to implement institutional change might therefore negatively affect the functioning of other 
institutions, not function at all if people react defiantly or bring unintended consequences if they re-
align their behavior in unexpected ways.4 In other words, there is no assurance that the replacement of 
an existing institution will pay off even if we have taken transition costs into account. Of course, it is 
also possible that institutional change succeeds without complications and realizes better results than 
expected. But the uncertainty regarding transition costs and outcomes may well discourage us from 
                                                        
3  For a general critique of the precautionary principle, see Sunstein (2005); for a comparison of the 
precautionary principle and the (Oakeshott’s) disposition to be conservative, see Turner (2010). 
4  Hirschman (1991) calls these the jeopardy, futility and perversity theses of reactionary rhetoric. 
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seeking change, and what economists call the law of diminishing marginal utility (i.e. the idea that the 
first piece of chocolate cake gives you greater pleasure than the second and third piece) warrants at least 
a moderate status-quo orientation in politics: if an innovation is equally likely to increase or decrease 
the overall value of the institutional order by the same amount, it is rational to oppose the innovation 
because ‘the potential welfare losses from moving in the “wrong” direction systematically exceed the 
potential gains from moving in the “right” direction’ (Brennan and Hamlin, 2004, p. 685). 
 
2.4 Existence value 
A fourth consideration is axiological in nature. It suggests that a specific kind of value resides in 
arrangements of the status quo because they are part of the status quo. If an arrangement is valuable as 
such, the idea goes, it also has some ‘existence value’ over and above its basic value. Institutional change 
is therefore properly resisted even if the basic value of the conceived alternative exceeds the basic value 
of the existing institution, as long as the latter’s existence value is large enough. Existence value can be 
based either on a thing’s particularity or the relation of individuals to that thing. Current scholarship is 
interested in existence value primarily because it constitutes a neglected axiological category (Brennan 
and Hamlin, 2016[a]; Cohen, 2013; Nebel, 2015). Its practical implications might not reach too far. 
Nevertheless, the fact that people occasionally identify with, and in that sense personally value, existing 
institutions should not be neglected when weighing pros and cons of institutional change (Wall, 2015, 
pp. 51, 60). There is, for instance, good egalitarian reason to replace the Queen in the United Kingdom 
with a president. At the same time, many British citizens have grown fond of the monarchic element. It 
has become an important part of British collective identity and substantially contributes to social 
cohesion. 
 
2.5 Lack of feasibility 
After taking considerations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) into account, we might be convinced that better 
institutional alternatives are actually available in theory, but doubt that they could ever be realized in 
practice. We would reach the conclusion that desirable institutional alternatives are unfeasible ideals, 
for instance, because they are construed on the basis of too optimistic assumptions about human nature 
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or because they fail to take technological limitations into account, and therefore settle with the status 
quo.  
 
2.6 Democratic authorization 
Even if a normatively superior and feasible alternative is available, an imperfect existing institution can 
still be worthy of conservation if it has been democratically authorized. Unless a formally correct 
democratic procedure authorizes institutional change, the government and the citizenry ought to feel 
obliged by the directives of existing institutions and recognize them as the appropriate arrangement. In 
other words, we have another reason for leaving things as they are if the people of a democracy has de 
facto authorized an existing institution to govern a particular aspect of its life. 
 
A strategic consideration that combines (2.5) and (2.6) should finally be mentioned here even though it 
doesn’t provide a distinct normative reason for non-change because it seems to be particular relevant 
for political practice and because it has often motivated conservative thinkers to defend a particular 
status quo. Suppose that we know what a normatively superior and technically feasible alternative to an 
existing institution looks like but that we also know that its realization lacks majority appeal and doesn’t 
stand a fair chance of passing the legislative process. Would we nevertheless insist on putting 
institutional change on the agenda, three scenarios seem to be the likely consequence: (a), we could 
waste our time. Or (b) we might create more favorable conditions for the desired (and desirable) change 
in the future. Conversely, however (c), we could give a forum to adverse policies and legislators might 
end up implementing an institutional arrangement that has majority appeal but that (we think) worsens 
rather than improves the status quo. Hence, the best thing to do could well be to not bring the issue up 
in the first place or paint the existing arrangements in rosy colors. Huntington (1957), for instance, 
argued in this sense that stubborn adherence to the imperfect status quo (USA in the 1950s) constituted 
the most promising strategy to prevent Soviet socialism (in his view a fundamentally misguided 
ideology) from making inroads. In a similar vein, Oakeshott (1991a) called for the cultivation of a 
disposition to be conservative in politics because he believed that too many politicians and fellow 
citizens (in the 1950s in the UK) were overly ambitious and entrepreneurial. 
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In sum, these considerations show the idea that occasionally the best thing to do in politics is to resist 
institutional innovation. Considerations (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4) indicate that a plausible case can be made 
for a general status-quo orientation in politics. Surely, this status-quo orientation would have to be a 
limited disposition that can be overruled by normative reason in any specific case. Moreover, that fact 
that a status-quo orientation is logically tenable does not imply that it is imperative. Perhaps, an equally 
logically tenable case can be made for a radical or idealist disposition (Brennan and Hamlin, 2016[a], 
367; Taylor, 2013; see also Clarke, 2017). Nevertheless, in politics one may plausibly proceed on the 
basis of a general, rebuttable presumption in favor of the given.5 Following this view, the burden of 
proof in politics rests on the progressive innovator (as well as the nostalgic who wishes to re-establish 
a status quo ante [cf. Huntington, 1957, p. 460]). Considerations (2.1), (2.5), (2.6) and the idea of 
strategic adherence are orthogonal to individual dispositions. They show that every one of us should, 
under certain conditions, refrain from forcing institutional change whatever our particular ideological 
views are. People of progressive self-understanding should sidetrack emancipatory aspirations just as 
nostalgics should put their reactionary visions on hold if there is no room for improvement (lack of 
alternatives, lack of feasibility), if (and as long as) the existing arrangement is democratically authorized, 
and if the acceptance of an imperfect institution is the only way to prevent greater evil. 
 
3 Conservation as a mode of political action 
Now suppose that we find ourselves in a situation in which we have actually reached the conclusion that 
the best thing to do is to abstain from changing some existing institution. What are the practical 
consequences of this conclusion? What needs to be done to leave things as they are? Must anything be 
done at all? This section argues that quietism isn’t the conservator’s recipe for success. Bringing about 
institutional non-change requires positive political action. 
 
3.1 Actor interference and designed institutional change 
                                                        
5  Note that this is not to deny that the precise content of the ‘given’ may often be in dispute. I will 
touch upon this issue in Section 4.4. 
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It seems quite reasonable to expect that an established institution persists unchanged as long as political 
actors don’t abolish or reform it. If this were generally the case, conservation would result from political 
inaction. And we would have to qualify this picture only marginally by the non-ideal theoretical 
consideration that there is always someone who pushes for change even if, all things considered, it would 
be the best to leave things as they are. Instead of staying entirely clear of politics, the key strategy for 
achieving institutional non-change would accordingly be to oppose the plans of starry-eyed idealists. 
Lord Derby comes close to epitomizing this understanding. He preferred to be leader of the opposition 
over the office of Prime Minister because he hoped that this would more effectively allow him to 
dissuade government from ‘doing things’ (Charmly, 1996, p. 2). 
Notably, this ‘stagnatist’ view is frequently presupposed in contemporary scholarship on (the 
justification of) status quo biases. Arguments that emphasize transition costs and the problems related 
with their calculation ([2a] and [2b]) typically establish that the value of an existing institution is 
outbalanced if the (basic) value of an alternative arrangement minus transition costs exceeds the (basic) 
value of the established institution plus path dependency benefits (and existence value) (e.g. O’Hara, 
2011, p. 88; but see O’Hara, 2016, p. 429). Hence, it is assumed that the established institution would 
continue to have the same overall value as time goes on unless it is replaced or substantially modified, 
which in turn means that institutions remain unchanged in the absence of direct actor interference. 
Corroborating this observation, Beyer (2005, p. 12; see also Thelen, 1999) argues that path dependency 
theory in general and, in particular, historical institutionalism, consider institutions to be eo ipso 
enduring entities. G.A. Cohen’s (2013) discussion of existence value (2c) is another case in point. He 
illustrates his argument with a discussion about whether Oxford’s All Souls College should be 
transformed into a less insular institution. He admits that opening the college to outside sources of 
funding and short-term research associates without college affiliation might realize its main purpose—
the promotion of research—better than the current arrangement. Nevertheless, he rejects calls for change 
on the basis that this change would bring a loss of the distinctive value that the college embodies as a 
valuable social creation, and because it would affect the college’s identity as an independent institution. 
As long as no active steps towards reform are undertaken by the college administration, Cohen therefore 
suggests at this point, All Soul’s identity persists unchanged. In another example, Cohen informs us 
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about the horrors he has when only considering the possibility that his fourty-four year-old eraser pencil 
could be replaced, regardless of whether the substitute would be a brand-new eraser pencil or one that 
is as old and worn as his own. Here, Cohen (2013, p. 167) not only suggests that his eraser persists 
unchanged as long as it isn’t replaced, but also that it has retained its identity for half a century despite 
the wear and tear caused by usage. 
However, towards the end of his paper Cohen (2013, p. 169, 172) notes that it will often be necessary 
to proactively do something to achieve the goal of keeping things as they are. The next section elaborates 
on this qualification and shows how institutions can become transformed even if there is no one trying 
to reform or abolish it.6 
 
3.2 Environmental developments and accidental institutional change 
Institutions may not change by themselves, but they neither exist in a vacuum. The stagnatist 
understanding of conservation fails to take the context in which institutions find themselves into account 
because changes in this context may accidentally affect their identity. As stated in the section on 
transition costs (2a), the meaning and working of an institution is contingent upon the meaning and 
working of interdependent (other) institutions and the political landscape more generally. If this context 
is transformed, the institution might cease to work properly or start doing some work it was not designed 
for. Furthermore, cultural and moral change, technological and scientific innovation or economic and 
ecological developments may also constitute ‘external shocks’ that threaten an institution’s continued 
existence. For simplicity, I will speak of ‘environmental developments’ to refer to such changes of an 
institution’s context that have the effect, designed by no one, of transforming the institution itself.7 
                                                        
6  Another qualification that Cohen adds holds that, strictly speaking, positive action cannot prevent 
but only mitigate decay. The overall view proposed in this paper is that conservation as a mode of 
political action can actually prevent institutional decay, even though it cannot guarantee the 
numerical identity of an institution over time. 
7  In addition to this, certain dynamics internal to institutions might erode the conditions for their own 
survival. Think, for instance, of Schumpeter’s (1975) point about the self-destructive tendency of 
 12 
All Souls College, to pick up on Cohen’s example, is ‘protected by countless societal conventions, 
legal structures that allow it autonomy, preserve its assets from seizure or despoliation’ (David quoted 
from Cohen, 2007, p. 8 fn. 11). Therefore, the college’s insular character could be mitigated not only by 
internal reforms but also by external legal change. Mass media and digitalization, to give another 
example, arguably redefined the functions of free speech rather radically (O’Hara, 2011, p. 61). And the 
gun laws in Svalbard, which establish a duty to carry arms outside settlements would certainly take on 
a different meaning should climate change exacerbate in such a way as to destroy the natural habitat of 
polar bears. Under conditions of environmental developments conservation becomes a task. The impact 
of relevant environmental developments must in some way be diverted if accidental institutional change 
is to be prevented. 
An unpromising strategy to go about the task of conservation is to try to prevent environmental 
developments in the first place. One would have to dissuade policy makers from ‘doing things’, reverse 
cultural, economic, etc. developments, and uninvent inventions, all of which suggests that this desire to 
bring history to a halt is a hopeless endeavour. ‘Change’, Burke (2005, p. 302) remarked in a letter to 
Sir Hercules Langrishe, ‘is the most powerful law of nature’. The context of institutions permanently 
undergoes transformations, which potentially affects these institutions. Nevertheless, Burke seems to 
have believed that institutions could in some meaningful way be kept unchanged. His famous dictum ‘a 
state without the means of some change is without the means for its conservation’ (Burke, 2009, p. 21) 
suggests that there is an alternative strategy for conservation under conditions of changing 
circumstances. Rephrased in the language used in this paper, Burke’s dictum claims that accidental 
institutional transformation caused by environmental developments can be averted by intentionally 
reforming the institution in question itself. The following section tries to make sense of this prima facie 
paradoxical idea. 
 
4 Resolving Burke’s conservation ‘paradox’ 
                                                        
capitalism. I bracket such forms of accidental change out of the present discussion as they would 
require a more detailed analysis than can be provided here. 
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Burke himself doesn’t do much to resolve what we might call the paradox of conservation, i.e. the idea 
that institutional change is a necessary means to achieve institutional non-change. He argues that order 
maintenance must be the first priority of government, and that the order can be maintained only if 
statespersons are prepared to undertake reforms. Yet the examples horticultural analogies he provides 
aren’t clear enough to positively explain of what kind such reforms would have to be. He tells us, for 
instance, that statespersons mustn’t follow the lead of bad gardeners who graft shoots onto a tree that 
are ‘alien to the nature of the plant’ (Burke, 2009, pp. 31, 33, 157-8). Translated into political practice, 
this means that the social engineering of rationalist philosophes fails to abide by the rules of good 
governance because it aims at institutional innovation. Statespersons who follow the lead of good 
gardeners instead aim at organic growth, in Burke’s view, but the goal of organic growth isn’t the same 
as the goal of institutional non-change. Instead it reflects his third principle of good governance, namely 
the ‘principle of improvement’, which may motivate quite different courses of action than the other two 
principles, namely the ‘principle of transmission’ and the ‘principle of conservation’ (Burke, 2009, p. 
33).8 Most to the point is Burke’s insertion that fixed rules can be reconciled with occasional deviations 
(Burke, 2009, p. 21). In cases of ‘extreme emergency’, even a ‘sacred’ institution such as the hereditary 
principle can be applied differently, he argues. The change, then, would have to be confined to the 
‘peccant part only; to the part which produced the necessary deviation.’ But apart from the fact that it 
isn’t clear whether Burke, here, thinks that environmental developments create the need for a political 
action aimed at conservation, he makes clear that any deviation would have to be a temporary exception, 
whereas environmental developments such as scientific or technological innovation may change the 
context of an institution forever. And while Burke’s also discussion of the Glorious Revolution in 
                                                        
8  Note that the discussions of good and bad kinds of change (e.g. organic vs. artificial, intimated vs. 
rationally conceived, piecemeal vs. large-scale, slow vs. fast, reversible vs. irreversible, demand-
driven vs. supply-driven change; Oakeshott, 1991b; O’Hara, 2011, p. 74; Quinton, 197, pp. 16–17) 
that are typically offered by analyses of conservative political theory don’t resolve the conservation 
paradox. These distinctions are usually expressions of a desire to minimize risk and keep the society 
on a steady, if slow, course towards growth or even progress. 
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particular, as well as of hierarchy and religion in general can be read as revolving around the question 
of institutional non-change, Burke’s Reflections are certainly stronger in terms of judgment and practical 
know-how than conceptual analysis.9 
 
4.1 Tomasi di Lampedusa: Faking real change 
Tomasi di Lampedusa’s The Leopard (2007) promises to enhance our understanding of Burke’s paradox 
and possible solutions. Scholars of conservatism at least have often professed that the novel’s leitmotif 
(‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’, Tomasi di Lampedusa, 2007, p. 28) 
expresses the same prima facie paradoxical strategy of conservation as Burke’s dictum (Alford and 
Hunt, 1988, p. 1; Hill, 2011, p. 86; Robin, 2010, pp. 372, 2015; Skorupski, 2015, pp. 401, 421 fn1).  
However, a close reading reveals significant differences. Tomasi di Lampedusa offers two 
interpretations of the idea that things must change to stay the same. The interpretation offered by 
Tancredi, the character who introduces the reader to the (seeming) paradox, maintains that real change 
can be averted by proactively enforcing petty change and deceiving people into thinking that real change 
has happened. Liberal revolutionaries, he contends, will be allured from abolishing the hierarchical 
society and establishing a republic if they are only offered a different king.10 The second interpretation 
is offered by Don Fabrizio, the novel’s main character. The revolutionaries, he predicts, will indeed 
bring a new king to power, kill a few people and even substitute the aristocrats with the bourgeoisie as 
ruling class. However, none of this qualifies as real change in his view because life’s general misery 
                                                        
9  If it weren’t for the present purposes, the ‘unspoken wisdom’ character of Burke’s approach could 
of course be considered a strength rather than a weakness (e.g. O’Hear, 1998, section 1). 
10  [Don Fabrizio:] ‘A Falconeri should be with us, for the King.’ Tancredi’s eyes began smiling again. 
‘For the King, yes, of course. But which King?’ The lad had one of those sudden serious moods 
which made him so mysterious and so endearing. ‘Unless we ourselves take a hand now, they’ll foist 
a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ (Tomasi di 
Lampedusa, 2007, p. 28). 
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will persist.11 Hence, Don Fabrizio champions what Albert O. Hirschman called the ‘futility thesis’: ‘the 
attempt at change is abortive […] in one way or another any change is, was, or will be largely surface, 
façade, cosmetic, hence illusory, as the “deep” structures of society remain wholly untouched’ 
(Hirschman, 1991, p. 43). Politics, Don Fabrizio thinks to himself accordingly, is a chimera; it ‘claim[s] 
to influence the course of fate that [is] actually flowing along on its own in another valley’ (Tomasi di 
Lampedusa, 2007, p. 31). In short, whereas the first interpretation in The Leopard establishes that fake 
change satisfies idealists’ desire for real change, the second claims that things will stay what they are 
however hard people to try to transform them into something else. While both interpretations establish 
a meaningful understanding of sameness over time, only the first articulates a political strategy. And 
neither of them reflects about the possibility of accidental institutional transformation resulting from 
environmental developments. 
 
4.2 Huntington: Changing secondary elements 
Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’, written a year before The Leopard was 
published, also mentions Burke’s paradox. Huntington depicts conservatism as a situational ideology 
that lacks a substantive ideal and that defends the status quo while opposing change if the established 
order is perceived to be exposed to danger. After rejecting other definitions of conservatism, he remarks 
en passant that ‘in order to preserve the fundamental elements of society, it may be necessary to 
acquiesce in change on secondary issues’ (1957, p. 455). Applied to individual legal institutions, 
Huntington’s remark implies that an institution will be conserved as long as its fundamental elements, 
or essence, is preserved (remains unchanged), even if (some of) its secondary elements change. He goes 
beyond other scholars who construed conservatism as a situational ideology that lacks a substantive 
ideal by considering change on secondary elements a means for the preservation of primary elements.12 
                                                        
11  [Don Fabrizio:] ‘What will happen then? Oh, well. Just negotiations punctuated by little harmless 
shooting, then all will be the same though all will be changed’ (Tomasi di Lampedusa, 2007, p. 33). 
12  Compare Huntington’s quote with, for instance, Tännsjö’s (1990, p. 47) considerations or the 
following statement by Wilson (1941, p. 33): ‘Conservatism is not necessarily a defense of the status 
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However, just like Tancredi, Huntington locates the potential challenges for existing arrangements in 
the activism of other political actors. Moreover, he elaborates neither on the question of why and how 
change of secondary elements helps to preserve the fundamental elements of a polity, nor what elements 
of a polity are fundamental and which secondary. 
Nevertheless, Huntington’s distinction between change on fundamental or change on secondary 
elements is worthy of discussion. With this distinction, Huntington presumably alludes to Aristotle’s 
considerations about Theseus’ paradox, where a ship’s planks are piece-by-piece replaced until the ship 
is completely redone, and the question arises whether the renovated ship is numerically identical with 
the original one. In Hobbes’ version of the paradox, the dismantled original planks are moreover used 
to build another ship. The puzzling result is that it isn’t clear which of the two, if any, is the original 
ship of Theseus (Hobbes, De Corpore, II. 11, 7). Formalists and materialists have given opposite 
answers, arguing either that the continuity of form overrules the continuity of matter or that the reverse 
is true. Because of this impasse contemporary philosophers of nature discussing the persistence of 
material objects over time have turned to developing theories that do not require a hierarchization of 
properties of material things (in particular: endurantism exdurantism, and perdurantism).13 However, 
this doesn’t mean that theorists of politics cannot make a plausible distinction between fundamental and 
secondary institutional components. Institutions are instruments of civil association after all, and their 
instrumentality requires a prioritization of certain institutional components over others.14  
Among institutional components, it is common to distinguish between an institution’s structure (i.e. 
organizational components, rules and roles), culture (i.e. underpinning or embodied values, conventions, 
norms and manifestations of symbolic representation), mechanisms (i.e. procedures and apparatus of 
sanctions and rewards) and outcomes (i.e. the social products of its manifest and latent functions). Quite 
                                                        
quo; in no case could it be a defense of everything as it is, but it is a defense of primary elements in 
the social structure, with concessions made on secondary problems’. 
13  For an overview, see Haslanger and Kurtz (2006). 
14  See Johannson (2006) for a detailed analogous argument about the persistence of organizations over 
time. 
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obviously, policy makers must compare the outcomes of an established institution with conceivable 
alternatives to decide whether it ought to be conserved or replaced, and an institution’s structure, culture 
and mechanisms are instrumental to bringing about its outcomes. Hence, an institution’s outcomes are 
primary to its structure, culture and mechanisms from the viewpoint of public reason.15 However, as 
institutional outcomes can never be fully known with certainty (recall sections [a] and [b]), it is more 
accurate to say that an institution’s mandate is fundamental to the institution’s identity. The institutional 
mandate refers not to what an institution actually does, but what it is meant to do, i.e. the social outcomes 
that the institution is meant to deliver, or, in Popper’s (1972, p. 133) words, its prima facie social 
functions and purposes. 
On this basis, we can specify Huntington’s solution of the conservation paradox by saying that 
reforms of an institution’s mandate constitute real changes and as such undermine the institution’s 
continued existence over time while reforms of its structure, culture or mechanisms do not. Following 
this line of thought, one might for instance argue, as does Wilson (1941, p. 33), that the institution of 
private property can be maintained even if its specifically instantiating system of relations of production 
is abandoned. For the conservation of the institution of marriage, to give a second example, it would 
appear to be crucial that it still encourages reproduction, child-raising, economic risk-sharing; that it 
fosters committed relationships among individuals, enhances personal security through a system of 
mutual care for the young and old, and perhaps domesticates sexual affairs; but it would be negligible 
whether priests or registrars solemnize marriage. 
 
4.3 Counterbalancing environmental change 
The previous subsection only explained why institutions can survive certain changes. To formally 
resolve Burke’s paradox of conservation we still need to show how and under what conditions reforms 
of an institution’s structure, culture or mechanisms help to preserve its mandate. To accomplish this 
                                                        
15  A related way of putting this is to say that the institutional components of structure, culture and 
mechanisms contingently instantiate the institution, which, ontologically speaking, exists prior to its 
contingent instantiation (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986, p. 54). 
 18 
task, we must integrate the variable of environmental developments. With this, we can understand 
conservation as a mode of political action that adapts institutions to make them suitable for their prima 
facie purposes and functions under novel circumstances. Thus, political conservation can be likened to 
the interpretive re-contextualization of historical texts: just as a contemporary reader of a historical text 
must counterbalance linguistic change to avoid anachronisms, so must legislators reform the 
instantiation of an institution in accordance with changing circumstances: an institution can be 
conserved, if its mandate is being preserved (i.e. remains unchanged) by means of changing the 
institution’s structure, culture or mechanisms in such a way as to counterbalance extra-institutional 
developments. 
This understanding helps to formally resolve the paradox of conservation, or at least to show that it 
is a seeming paradox only. If no circumstances between t and t+1 alter, stagnatists and Burkeans 
recommend the same course of action: political inaction. However, if relevant circumstances alter, the 
former must counter technological, economic, etc. developments to prevent accidental institutional 
change. The latter, in contrast, will try to counterbalance environmental developments to keep the 
institution in step with the times.  
The logic can be illustrated by taking up the hypothetical Svalbard case. Imagine that polar bears 
really go extinct in Svalbard. The prima facie social function and purpose of the gun laws (to wit: 
personal safety) would be most authentically preserved by prohibiting, rather than requiring, the 
carrying of arms outside settlements. Drastic environmental developments may require us to turn an 
institution upside down to conserve it and prevent its accidental transformation into something else. The 
non-hypothetical case of marriage also illustrates the logic that reform facilitates the preservation of 
institutional mandates. It is after all fair to say that since the 1950s a number of relevant environmental 
developments have occurred that affect the persistence of the institution of marriage. To name but a few 
of these changes: the nutritional quality of infant formulas has immensely improved, such that breast-
feeding is no longer strictly necessary; homosexuality isn’t any more considered to be abnormal by most 
segments of Western societies; children of same-sex couples do not seem to become systematically the 
victim of homophobic social ostracism, etc.; strictly speaking, even heterosexual intercourse is no longer 
a necessary condition for fertilization. Thus, due to bio-medical innovation and change of social norms 
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an actualization of the institution of marriage may indeed have become exigent. The institution’s prima 
facie social functions and purposes (such as encouraging reproduction, child-raising, economic risk-
sharing, fostering committed relationships among individuals, enhancing security through a system of 
mutual care for the young and old, and domesticating sexual affairs) today can be equally instantiated 
in couples of different sex and same-sex couples. Referring to the principle of non-discrimination is one 
(a progressive, non-Burkean) way to justify the same-sex inclusive regulation of marriage; saying that 
we don’t want this institution to change is another.16 
 
4.4 Disputes about conservation 
Whether the context of some institutions has changed significantly enough to threaten its persistence is 
a question that is appropriately answered neither by theorists nor practitioners of politics, but instead by 
scientists. Experts are best suited after all to empirically assess whether and which economic, 
technological, ecological, etc. developments have taken place. Thus, conservation as a mode of political 
action entails a technocratic dimension even though proper political disputes may arise when it comes 
to the question of whether, which and to what extent changing circumstances have a potential to affect 
existing institutions. Yet the crux of the matter lies elsewhere, namely in the identification of 
institutional mandates, and a brief comparison with the partially analogous challenge in constitutional 
interpretation elucidates how likely it is that intricate controversies will arise.  
In constitutional interpretation, there are two major points of contention. First, a lot of controversy 
revolves around the question of whether constitutions are living traditions. Those who think they are 
basically demand that the prima facie social functions and purposes (i.e. the ‘mandate’) of constitutional 
articles be adapted (by the judiciary) to changing circumstances. This controversy is of secondary 
importance for the present task. It is beyond question that institutional change is often what legislators 
should seek but when it isn’t, redefining mandates doesn’t facilitate conservation. The second issue that 
provokes disagreement in constitutional interpretation concerns the method by which constitutional 
                                                        
16  For a detailed presentation of such a ‘traditionalist’ case for same-sex marriage, see [Note suppressed 
to ensure anonymity]. 
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mandates are identified. This problem does apply to the identification of institutional mandates, even a 
forteriori. The problem of method is even more complicated in the case of institutions than constitutions 
as tricky questions arise when it comes to discerning the relevant body of source material. Parliamentary 
proceedings might be as important as legal documents for a reconstruction of institutional mandates, 
and which to include will depend not only upon methodological choices.17 Also, disputes may arise 
about whether an earlier reform of the institution in question had effectively redefined the institutional 
mandate instead of merely adapting the institutional structure, culture or mechanisms. The present 
article can only bring up the questions of method, sources and midstream temporal flux in an institution’s 
mandate rather than providing answers for them.18 Yet posing these questions at least makes clear that 
intricate political disputes may arise even if the agreed policy goal is to leave everything as it is. 
 
 
5 Implications and outlook 
The first part of this paper listed six considerations that may lead us in a given situation to the conclusion 
that the best thing to do is to prevent institutional change. It also showed that no commitment to a 
specific ideology is necessary to reach that conclusion. Conservation as a mode of political action may, 
but need not be, motivated by conservative ideology, not even by a status-quo orientation. The second 
part argued that extra-institutional developments such as technological and scientific innovation, 
ecological degradation or economic globalization can accidentally transform the meaning and 
functioning of institutions. Hopes to conserve an institution and prevent its decay, I argued, are therefore 
likely to be frustrated by political quietism. Even if relevant circumstances do not change, political 
conservation will under non-ideal theoretical conditions at least require to dissuade other political actors 
in one way or another from undertaking institutional transformation. As soon as relevant environmental 
                                                        
17  Methods that use a broader body of sources might be confronted with the ‘baseline problem’, which 
also haunts ecological restoration efforts. 
18  A particularly promising method might be found in Axel Honneth’s (2014, pp. 1–12) ‘normative 
reconstruction’. 
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developments take place, however, conservation becomes a proactive mode of political action that must 
resolve Burke’s paradox according to change is a necessary means to achieve non-change. Table 1 
summarizes these strategies of political conservation. 
 
Table 1: Strategies of political conservation 
Challenge to institution Political strategy 
None Quietism (Don Fabrizio) 
Designed reform or innovation 
(caused by legislators or activists) 
Dissuasion (Derby, Huntington) 
Faking real change (Tancredi) 
 
Accidental change 
(caused by environmental developments) 
Renovative reformism (Burke) 
 
The third part developed a formal solution to Burke’s paradox by construing conservation as a reformism 
that aims at preserving an institution’s mandate by modifying elements of its structure, culture or 
mechanisms in correspondence with environmental developments. The forth part showed that political 
conflicts are likely to even among persons who are equally interested in leaving things as they are. 
Political conservation, therefore, really is a political mode of action. Its peculiarity, compared with 
progressive (or reactionary) kinds of reformism is that reforms are undertaken for the sake of renovation 
instead of innovation (or restauration). 
A straightforward implication of the presented argument concerns our understanding of interventions 
in academic and public discourse on politics. Reformism, calls for institutional transformation, even 
advocacy for radical change is not necessarily a sign of a progressive or reactionary politics; it can also 
be a non-emancipatory and non-nostalgic reflex to changing circumstances. We should therefore make 
more transparent whether our recommendations for institutional change are meant to emancipate us 
from the normativity inherent in already existing arrangements or adapt these arrangements to changing 
circumstances – or, however, to settle a political controversy over institutional mandates under dispute 
or in flux.  
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A second implication concerns the reasons for not changing some established institution. The 
rebuttable presumption in favor of the given is weakened, though not invalidated, by the fact that 
conservation comes with costs of its own. Whereas institutional innovation incurs transition costs, 
institutional conservation incurs maintenance costs. Moreover, their amount may not be known with 
certainty in advance. There is a risk that political actors misjudge the relevance of environmental 
developments as well as a risk that reform measures peter out or cause unwanted consequences. 
Furthermore, the fact that the task of conservation often requires renovative reformism means that 
maintenance costs will be particularly high if citizens identify not only with an institution’s mandate, 
but also with that institution’s contingent instantiation. As argued before, the extinction of polar bears 
in Svalbard would, should it happen, require transforming the duty to carry arms outside settlements 
into a restrictive gun control law to guarantee personal safety. But Svalbardians may then already have 
grown so fond of their guns that they consider the possession of arms relevant for their central organizing 
self-conception. Conservative dispositions and political conservationism can come to pull in opposite 
directions. 
The main goal of this paper has been to improve our theoretical understanding of the justification 
and operation of a mode of political action to which we are thrown back if improvement of the status 
quo is not an available option. This mode of political action is not, to reaffirm, a project of the Right. 
The French Revolutionaries knew this. They were aware that any act of founding is futile unless 
provisions are made to stabilize the new foundation, and it therefore doesn’t come as a surprise that they 
were the first to use the term ‘conservative’ as a political concept and claim the title of being 
conservative for themselves long before the enemies of the ideas of the French Revolution did.19 Today, 
conservation as a mode of political action is even more relevant than back then. Apart from the already 
                                                        
19  Already in 1789, the goal was articulated to establish a ‘constitution conservatrice’. Napoleon’s 
famous declaration from 19 Brumaire 1799 ‘Les ideés conservatrices, tutélaires, 'libérales' sont 
rentrées dans leur droit par la dispersion des factieux qui opprimaient les Conseils’ reflects in a report 
of 18 Thermidor of year IV that characterizes government as a ‘gouvernement tutélaire et 
conservateur.’ (quotations from Vierhaus, 1982, p. 537). 
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mentioned subjective disbelief in progress among many citizens, a significant number of institutions in 
our liberal democracies appear to be empirically legitimate, linked with the central organizing self-
conception of citizens, costly to replace, normatively justifiable or likely to stand a chance of being 
replaced in the democratic process only by normatively inferior alternatives. In addition to this, the 
world around institutions is changing in unprecedented quality and pace (Scheuermann and Rosa, 2008). 
Freedom of speech and privacy, as we know them, are affected by processes of digitalization and the 
arrival of Islamist terrorism in Western metropoleis; the welfare state totters in the face of demographic 
aging trends, migration waves, increased mobility, and economic globalization; technocratic closure and 
populism reflexes challenge the (multi-)party model of representation (Caramani, 2017); and all of these 
environmental developments put liberal democracy as we know it under pressure. Robert A. Dahl’s 
(1989, p. 319) diagnosis that democracy will not stay the same unless it undergoes a third transformation 
appears to be more topical than ever. 
Ironically, perhaps, the Left should have the greatest objective interest in a theory of conservation. 
Despite its progressive self-understanding, many on the Left appear to be afraid that basically any further 
development will diminish the past achievements of the liberal-democratic order, or even that 
institutional decline has already occurred (e.g. Crouch, 2004). According to Turner, this tendency 
becomes particularly clear when considering the European Left’s relationship to the welfare state: 
For the European Left, any alteration in the arrangement of the welfare state, its benefits, its 
actual practices, is experienced not as opportunity or even as opportunity mixed with risk, but 
as loss of the familiar. And these societies are increasingly present oriented and concerned with 
the enjoyment of the present, which is more and more understood as the best of all possible 
worlds. The European Left has no grand project. It is committed instead to resistance, resistance 
to what it characterizes as neo-liberalism and the savage inequalities of feral capitalism, and, on 
a practical and less rhetorical level to the specific rights that are enjoyed by citizens of a 
pervasive welfare state. (Turner, 2010, p. 213) 
If it turned out that we are overburdened even with the seemingly moderate task of preventing things 
from getting worse, would we have to consider if this provides us with an indirect justification for a 
progressive bias in politics? Might the acceleration and the complexity of the world serve as a 
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vindication for an adventurous mode of political action that promotes changes designed to implement 
institutional innovation even if the net outcome of innovation is unlikely to be superior to the existing 
state of affairs? One of George Bernard Shaw’s (1957, p. 260) maxims for revolutionists gets right to 
the heart of this idea:  
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world.  
The unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.  
Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man. 
However, not only innovation but also conservation can be a vital source of progress (see also Graham 
and Thrift, 2007). Attempts to prevent institutional decay, even if perfectly justified in the situation that 
obtains, may not be crowned with success. Conservation attempts may often only imperfectly manage 
to actualize an institution due to the tricky task of discerning the relevant environmental developments 
in a highly complex and confusing world. Already the unintended consequences of such imperfect 
conservation efforts can, as any unintended consequence, turn out to be benign rather than malign. On 
top of that, however, the incessant task of actualization in a permanently changing context facilitates a 
before-and-after comparison between the institutional mandate and its outcomes, and thus serves as a 
feedback loop of trial-and-error experimentation that may well enable us to advance in the long run. 
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